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Abstract
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are promoted as a technology that will create a future with
effortless driving and virtually no traffic accidents. AV companies claim that, when fully
developed, the technology will eliminate 94% of all accidents that are caused by human error.
These AVs will likely avoid the large number of crashes caused by impaired, distracted or
reckless drivers. But there remains a significant proportion of crashes for which no driver is
directly responsible. In particular, the absence of connectivity of an AV with its neighboring
vehicles (V2V) and the infrastructure (I2V) leads to a lack of information that can induce such
crashes. Since AV designs today do not require such connectivity, these crashes would persist in
the future. Using prototypical examples motivated by the NHTSA pre-crash scenario typology,
we show that fully autonomous vehicles cannot guarantee safety in the absence of connectivity.
Combining theoretical models and empirical data, we also argue that such hazardous scenarios
will occur with a significantly high probability. This suggests that incorporating connectivity
is an essential step on the path towards safe AV technology.
1 Introduction
With the introduction of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology, the vision of a safe transportation
system with effortless driving seemed within reach. The vision captured the imagination of both
venture capitalists and established automobile companies. Within just three years from August
2014 to June 2017 the AV industry attracted more than $80 billion dollars [13], so over the decade
at least $100 billion dollars have been invested, exceeding the cost of the Apollo program. The
AV companies are all pursuing the same goal: to develop a fully autonomous vehicle that does not
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communicate with either infrastructure or neighboring vehicles in order to function safely [3]. In
2012, Google co-founder Sergey Brin predicted AVs will be widely available in five years, and AV
companies shared the belief that the goal would be realized by 2020 [5, 14, 18].
But in 2020 the goal seems out of reach. John Krafcik, the CEO of Waymo, recently declared that
full autonomy may never be achieved [10]. Kyle Vogt, the President and CTO of Cruise, argued
that in urban driving an AV must be able to hand off control to a human safety driver [31]. But
the requirement of a safety driver drastically undermines the AV business case.
The general consensus now seems to be that if full autonomy is to be achieved, it is decades away
[12]. Over time, the overwhelming complexities involved in urban driving have become apparent.
In order to be safe, the AV needs to routinely navigate through out-of-the-ordinary road conditions,
unseen obstacles, vehicles with conflicting paths, and inattentive pedestrians. Interestingly, the
same error-prone humans who are responsible for 94% of all accidents are able to seamlessly drive on
unknown roads and to respond to unexpected behaviors by other vehicles on the road with minimal
training (∼ 20 hours) compared to their AV counterparts that have been ‘trained’ on countless
hours of simulation and road tests. The central approach currently followed by AV companies is to
break the complex driving task into sub-tasks of sensing, perception, behavior prediction, planning
and control. The presumption is that as these sub-tasks are solved with greater precision, we get
closer to eliminating all traffic crashes.
The 94% statistic frequently quoted by AV companies has its origins in a report on national crashes
published by the National Highway Transportation Safety Authority (NHTSA) in 2008 [1]. However,
the actual statement in the report is as follows: It turns out that the 94% of crashes attributed
to human error involve not just impaired or distracted driving, but also such causes as “false
assumption of other’s actions”, “decision error”, “recognition error” and “inadequate surveillance”.
This implies that all such crashes may not simply be a consequence of having reckless, error-prone
humans at the wheel. Instead, many such crashes could be a result of unavoidable hazardous traffic
scenarios the involved vehicles found themselves in. Even if AVs replace humans, it is unclear
whether they will be able to avoid such crashes. What fraction of these crashes will be eliminated
with the introduction of AVs on the roads remains an open question. The AV literature does not
address this question.
An alternative technology could provide some clues to answer this question. The last couple of
decades have seen rapid adoption of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS). These include
Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB), Lane Keeping Assist (LKA), and Adaptive Cruise Control
(ACC). Like AV technology, these systems aim to eliminate human error by either assisting or
warning the driver (eg., Forward Collision Warning) or automate driving in a well specified setting
(eg., Automatic Parking). Each ADAS caters to a certain type of crash. For example, AEB and
LKA reduce rear end and lane departure crashes respectively. It can be argued that for such types
of crash scenarios, an AV can do no better than the corresponding ADAS. Thus, ADAS crash
reduction studies could provide a good estimate for potential crash reduction due to AV technology.
One such study analyzed the field effectiveness of General Motors ADAS based on safety data from
3,785,419 vehicles across 22 models [15]. It found that percent crash reduction ranged from 3% to
81% depending on the ADAS considered. Notably, while ADAS help improve traffic safety, they
fail to prevent a significant proportion of system-relevant crashes. This might presage a similar
outcome in the future with AVs. Another study predicting AV-related road traffic fatalities using
the German In-Depth Accident Study database arrived at the same conclusion [16].
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The NHTSA report on crashes in the period 2011-15 classifies crashes into 36 scenario types based
on the events leading up to the crash [29]. For example, the crash type “Backing into Vehicle”
includes all crashes in which a vehicle collides with another vehicle while backing. The report also
contains the statistical distribution of crashes across these types. This can serve as a useful tool in
understanding why crashes occur and what kind of crashes can be avoided by AVs. For instance,
“Crossing Paths” is a grouping of 6 crash types involving two vehicles moving perpendicular to
each other with conflicting paths – a common occurrence at intersections. This group accounts for
19% of all crashes and damages of $135.4 billion each year. An interesting aspect of such crashes
is that it is often unclear which vehicle is at fault. There could be static obstacles or surrounding
vehicles occluding the field of view of both parties involved so that they do not see each other until
it is too late. Crossing Paths crashes could also occur due to one or more vehicles violating traffic
rules such that their paths coincide. Even if AVs have perfect sensing and perception capabilities,
they will not be immune to occlusions and as a result, will end up in such hazardous scenarios.
“Changing Lanes” is another crash grouping that accounts for 12% of all crashes and damages of
$32.9 billion every year. Lane changing involves searching for large enough gaps in traffic so as to
safely complete the maneuver. Such large gaps may not always be available, especially during peak
hours. In such circumstances with small traffic gaps, the lag vehicle either cooperates or is forced
to create the required gap so that the ego vehicle can successfully change lanes. Thus, inaccurate
predictions of the lag vehicle behavior can lead to dangerous scenarios which ultimately lead to
crashes.
A common theme that ties together the crash scenarios discussed above is that connectivity with
either infrastructure (I2V) or neighboring vehicles (V2V) would eliminate such crashes. In the case
of occlusions and traffic violators at intersections, I2V communication would ensure that the involved
vehicles “see” each other in time [9, 21, 25]. For the lane changing case, V2V communication would
ensure that the involved parties are in agreement, thus preventing a potential hazardous situation
[17, 32].
At the same time, relying on connectivity has its own costs. Foregoing connectivity allows com-
panies to deploy their vehicles on the roads without having to wait for the required sensors and
communication channels being set up. Moreover, security concerns arise with dependency on sur-
rounding vehicles or infrastructure for information [4, 20]. Thus, an interesting question that arises
in this context is whether it is possible to avoid crashes in the scenarios described above without
relying on connectivity. In this paper, we argue that even with perfect sensing and perception
capabilities, fully autonomous vehicles cannot guarantee safety in such scenarios. We develop a
theoretical model for each of these scenarios in order to illustrate why such crashes will persist. We
also discuss how connectivity with either infrastructure or surrounding vehicles can alleviate these
safety concerns.
2 Occlusions
Let us consider a commonly occurring on-road occlusion scenario and analyze how an AV should
act in order to be safe. Consider an AV at a signalized traffic intersection on the left-turning lane
as illustrated in Figure 1. There is no protected left-turn phase, so it is waiting for gaps in traffic to
make a left turn. The left-turn opposing lane is queued up, thus, blocking the AV’s view of through
moving vehicles (TMVs) in the opposing lane. The objective of the AV is to choose the right time
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Figure 1: AV (in yellow) making unprotected left turn with through moving vehicles occluded by
queued up left-turning vehicles. The AV’s occluded field of view is illustrated by the shaded yellow
region. The red box CZ denotes the conflict zone.
to make a left-turn so that it does not collide with through-moving traffic. This scenario falls within
Crash Type 30: Left Turn Across Path/Other Direction (LTAP/OD) of the NHTSA crash typology
which accounts for 5.8% of all crashes. Furthermore, such crossing path crashes have the highest
comprehensive costs and equivalent lives lost among all crash groups in the NHTSA report [29].
Recognizing the safety costs of such crashes, fleet operators such as UPS design their routes so that
they do not involve left turns [11].
We assume that the opposing through lane is free-flowing and the arrival of TMVs is modeled as
a Poisson process with rate λ. We assume that the through moving vehicles are self-preserving
but not anticipative, i.e., a through moving vehicle will make an evasive maneuver (for eg., hit
the brakes) once it sees the left-turning AV, else it maintains its current speed. As AVs will have
to drive among human drivers when they are introduced on the roads, we assume that all other
vehicles are human driven with a reaction time ρ ∈ [0.7, 2.5] 1. We maintain this assumption for
the rest of the paper. We use the following values for relevant intersection geometry and vehicle
parameters:
• Lane width - 4 m,
• Vehicle length - 4 m,
• Vehicle width - 2 m,
• Maximum acceleration rate - 3 m/s2,
• Maximum deceleration rate - 4 m/s2.
1We use the term reaction time to refer to the total time required for perception (mental processing time for
recognizing need for evasive action), driver response (time taken to make the evasive maneuver, for eg., hitting the
brakes), and device response (time between driver’s action and corresponding vehicle response). This is also referred
to as stopping time in the literature [8].
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2.1 Can the AV make an unprotected left-turn with guaranteed safety?
We first aim to understand under what conditions an AV can make an unprotected left-turn ir-
respective of the arrival process of TMVs. In this case, the AV’s safety depends on whether the
TMV can brake in time to avoid the AV. The worst possible case for an AV in such a situation
is when the TMV is just beyond its field of view when it decides to make a left-turn. We use the
term conflict zone to refer to the region of the intersection where the paths of the left-turning and
through moving vehicles coincide - marked in red in Figure 1. Let vth and adec denote the velocity
and maximum deceleration rate of the TMVs. Let dCZ denote the distance from conflict zone at
which the TMV first sees the AV. Based on the above parameters for intersection geometry and
vehicle dimensions, dCZ turns out to be 12 m. As the TMV takes time ρ to react to the left-turning
AV, its distance from the conflict zone when it starts decelerating is dCZ−vthρ. Assuming the TMV
brakes at the maximum rate adec, it can avoid a crash with the AV as long as
v2th ≤ 2adec(dCZ − vthρ). (1)
Even under the most optimistic choice for TMV reaction time ρ = 0.7 s [8], an AV can be guaranteed
to be safe only if the TMVs are moving at no more than 17 mph. This is much lower than typical
through moving vehicle speeds observed at intersections, especially because they have right-of-way
in such a setting. This suggests that an AV cannot guarantee safety while making an unprotected
left-turn under such occlusions.
2.2 Can the AV be “safe enough” while making an unprotected left-
turn?
Realizing that it is impossible to guarantee safety in this setting, let us consider an AV that is
willing to accept a probability of collision no greater than pcoll under such an occlusion. Note that
the arrival rate λ of TMVs is unknown to the AV apriori. Let us assume a through movement
velocity vth = 25 mph. We define exposure distance dexp as the TMV’s distance from the conflict
zone at which it first sees the AV. Let dminexp denote the minimum exposure distance such that the
TMV can brake to a stop before reaching the conflict zone. If dexp < d
min
exp , then we have a potential
collision. Although we account for the TMVs attempting to brake when they see the AV, we do not
consider more complicated evasive maneuvers like swerving that could also be used by the TMVs.
Such scenarios in which a collision would occur unless evasive maneuvers are carried out by the
involved vehicles are referred to as traffic conflicts 2. It is reasonable to expect that at least some of
these traffic conflicts will result in crashes. We allow for the possibility of other evasive maneuvers
being used by the TMVs by introducing γ - the ratio of traffic conflicts to collisions. We analyze
the probability of a traffic conflict and then translate it to a collision probability using the following
equation:
pconf = γpcoll. (2)
2The traffic conflicts technique was introduced by Perkins and Harris as a surrogate measure of traffic safety [23].
A traffic conflict is defined as an event that would lead to a crash unless an evasive action such as braking or swerving
is taken. As traffic crashes are very rare events, actual crash data is scarce and unreliable as a safety metric. On the
other hand, traffic conflicts are abundant and are amenable to empirical estimation. The estimated number of traffic
conflicts can then be multiplied by a suitable factor depending on the traffic scenario to get the predicted number of
traffic crashes.
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Note that the conflict-to-collision ratio γ depends on the scenario considered. For our analysis, we
use γ = 1490 based on an empirical estimate of opposing left-turn conflict-to-collision ratio in [7] 3.
Given that the TMV arrivals are Poisson, the probability of traffic conflict can be translated into
the probability that there is a Poisson arrival in an interval of tconf sec, where
tconf =
dminexp − dCZ
vth
. (3)
If the AV were to know λ, its decision is straightforward. It should make the left-turn if the
probability of at least one TMV arrival in a time interval of length tconf sec is less than the AV’s
maximum allowed probability of traffic conflict, i.e.,
1− e−λtconf ≤ pconf . (4)
Thus, the AV would make the turn if λ ≤ λmax, where
λmax =
1
tconf
log
(
1
1− pconf
)
. (5)
However, the AV does not know λ. An interesting question arises in such a scenario: In the time
the AV waits at the intersection, can it estimate λ with reasonable confidence such that it can make
the left-turn when the situation is indeed safe?
This question can be posed as a hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : λ ≥ λmax, H1 : λ < λmax. (6)
The AV observes through moving traffic while it waits for tobs seconds at the intersection. It decides
to make the left turn if it can reject the null. For a level-α test, this implies that the AV makes the
turn if it sees no TMV arrivals in tobs seconds, i.e.,
e−λmaxtobs ≤ α. (7)
Thus, we have
tobs =
1
λmax
log
(
1
α
)
. (8)
It is not clear apriori what an acceptable collision probability pcoll should be. We derive an upper
bound p¯coll for this quantity by choosing the intersection with the highest rate of opposing left-turn
crashes in San Francisco as our baseline - Market Street and Octavia Street with 10 crashes in the
period 2011-17 [26]. Then,
p¯coll =
Number of opposing left-turn crashes per year
Number of left-turns under occlusion per year
. (9)
3Table 8 in [7] contains conflict-to-collision ratios for traffic scenarios such as opposing left-turn, left-turn same
direction and through cross traffic under varying traffic volumes. Note that the conflict-to-collision ratio γ is the
inverse of the accident/conflict ratio in Table 8.
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Assuming that the occlusion scenario occurs during peak hours, we have
Number of left-turns under occlusion per year = Left-turn rate× Number of peak hours per day
(10)
× Number of weekdays in a year.
Assuming a flow of 1000 vehicles/hr through the intersection and 10% of vehicles turning left
on average, we have a left-turn rate of 100 turns/hr. Assuming 4 peak hours/weekday, we get
p¯coll = 1.4× 10−5. We use this upper bound in our calculations to get a lower bound for tobs using
(8). We use γ = 1490 based on [7]. As pconf = γp¯coll = 2.1 × 10−2, we choose α = 10−4 for
the hypothesis testing problem. As vth = 25 mph (11.18 m/s), we get d
min
exp = 23.45 m using (1).
Plugging in our model parameters, it turns out that the AV needs to observe traffic for tobs = 443
seconds in order to make its decision to turn. Clearly, this is prohibitively high and hence, the AV
cannot safely make the turn with the required collision probability 4.
2.3 Occluded Pedestrians
The scenario considered in the previous subsections gets even more challenging when there are
pedestrians involved. Crashes involving pedestrians have the highest fatality rate among all crash
groupings in the NHTSA typology [29]. Such crashes account for 58% of all fatal crashes near
intersections in the city of San Francisco [26]. In what follows, we investigate the role of occlusions
in causing such crashes.
The NHTSA pre-crash scenario typology includes two crash types to classify vehicle-pedestrian
crashes based on whether the vehicle is performing a maneuver (eg., passing, turning) - Crash Type
10: Pedestrian/Maneuver and Crash Type 11: Pedestrian/No Maneuver [29]. However, it does not
specify if occlusions contributed to the crash. Through a further classification of the above crash
types based on possible occlusions, we arrive at three pre-crash scenarios in which pedestrians being
occluded by a surrounding vehicle leads to a crash as illustrated in Figure 2.
• Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 1: The AV is turning left at the beginning of its green phase
while pedestrians are trying to cross as soon as possible since the pedestrian phase is changing
from the flashing phase to red. The field of view of the left-turning AV is occluded by queued
up vehicles on the adjacent right lane. Such a scenario can occur in both protected and
permissive left turn signal phases.
• Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 2 As the left-turning AV enters the intersection, it cannot
detect pedestrians on the crosswalk as its field of view is obstructed by the through moving
vehicles. This results in a crash if the AV cannot brake in time to avoid the pedestrians. Such
a situation can arise during the permissive left-turn phase.
• Pedestrian/No Maneuver The field of view of the through moving AV is occluded by
stopped vehicles on adjacent lanes. At the beginning of the green through phase, the AV might
collide with pedestrians who could not finish crossing during the previous phase, especially
those who entered the crosswalk during the yellow phase.
4As we already account for braking action by TMVs, the conflict-to-collision ratio γ chosen for our analysis is
considerably larger than the actual γ for the given setting. Thus, the required waiting time at the intersection is
even larger than what we have calculated.
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Figure 2: Three pre-crash scenarios with occluded pedestrians: AV (in yellow) is occluded by
stopped or moving vehicles (in blue), and the AV’s occluded field of view is illustrated by the
shaded yellow region.
We model pedestrians as Poisson arrivals on the crosswalk moving at a fixed velocity. We assume
that they are inattentive and as a result, do not attempt to evade the AV. Although this is not
always the case, such inattentive behavior is commonly observed during changes in signal phase
when pedestrians hastily attempt to cross to the other side of the road. We use the term pedestrian
conflict zone to refer to the region of crosswalk coinciding with the AV’s path. For our analysis,
t = 0 is the time at which the AV first detects the pedestrian. We introduce the following notation:
• λped: arrival rate (ped/s) of pedestrians,
• vped: pedestrian speed (m/s) when crossing on yellow/flashing phase/at the end of pedestrian
phase,
• Dped to crash: distance (m) from pedestrian’s position at t = 0 to the center of pedestrian
conflict zone,
• vveh left: the left-turn speed (m/s),
• vth: the through speed (m/s) before/at the intersection,
• Dveh to crash: distance (m) from vehicle’s position at t = 0 to the pedestrian conflict zone,
• aacc: maximum AV acceleration rate (m/s2),
• adec: maximum AV deceleration rate (m/s2),
• wAV: Width of AV (m).
We begin our analysis with the Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 2 scenario, and then show how this ap-
proach can be suitably modified to accommodate the other two scenarios. Notice that the following
conditions need to satisfied for a Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 2 scenario to end up in a crash:
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• Condition 1: The AV’s view of the crosswalk is obstructed by passing through moving
vehicles when it is making an unprotected left-turn.
• Condition 2: When the AV finally detects the pedestrian, it does not have enough time to
brake to a stop before the conflict zone.
Figure 3: Calculating conflict probability for Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 2.
Assuming that both the above conditions hold, a crash can occur if the pedestrian’s original tra-
jectory coincides with that of the AV. When the AV first detects the pedestrian, it has two choices
depending on the location of the pedestrian on the crosswalk: decelerate so that pedestrian can
cross the conflict zone before it reaches there or accelerate and cross the conflict zone before the
pedestrian arrives there. As we do not account for pedestrians being attentive or more complicated
maneuvers such as swerving by the AV, we classify such a scenario as a traffic conflict, as in Section
2.2. Let δ denote the time required by pedestrian to cross the conflict zone, i.e., δ = wAV/vped. Let
tacc denote the time taken by the AV to reach the conflict zone while it accelerates. Then,
tacc =
√
2aaccDveh to crash + v2veh left − vveh left
aacc
. (11)
In this case, a conflict occurs if the pedestrian arrives at the center of the conflict zone in the time
interval Tacc = [tacc − δ/2, tacc + δ/2]. Let tdec denote the time taken by AV to reach the conflict
zone while it decelerates. Then, we have
tdec =
vveh left −
√
v2veh left − 2adecDveh to crash
adec
. (12)
In this case, a conflict occurs if the pedestrian arrives at the center of the pedestrian conflict zone
in the time interval Tdec = [tdec − δ/2, tdec + δ/2]. Thus, a conflict is unavoidable if the pedestrian
arrives in the time interval Tacc ∩ Tdec = [tdec − δ/2, tacc + δ/2]. This translates into the following
condition on Dped to crash:
Dped to crash ∈ [max(0, (tdec − δ/2)vped), (tacc + δ/2)vped. (13)
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The probability of this event can be interpreted as the probability of arrival of at least one pedestrian
in a time interval of length (tacc − tdec + δ). As the pedestrian arrival process is Poisson with rate
λped, we have
Pscenario2(Conflict — Conditions 1 and 2 hold) = 1− e−λped(tacc−tdec+δ). (14)
Based on intersection geometry and commonly observed values for the model parameters, we have:
vped = 2 m/s, λped =
1
60
ped/s, wAV = 2 m, vveh left = 15 mph (6.71 m/s), Dveh to crash = 4 m,
aacc = 3 m/s
2, and adec = 4 m/s
2. Then, δ = wAV/vped = 1 sec. Using (11), (12), (13), and (14),
we have
Dped to crash ∈ [0.55, 2.07] m,
Pscenario2(Conflict — Conditions 1 and 2 hold) = 0.0125. (15)
The above analysis can be conveniently modified for the other two scenarios. For the Pedestrian/No
Maneuver scenario, Condition 1 should be rephrased as: “The AV’s view of the crosswalk is occluded
by stopped vehicles in the adjacent lane when it is passing through the intersection at the beginning
of the green phase”. Condition 2 remains the same. The probability computation in (11) and (12)
are hence modified as follows while (14) remains the same:
tacc =
√
2aaccDveh to crash + v2th − vth
aacc
, (16)
tdec =
vth −
√
v2th − 2adecDveh to crash
adec
. (17)
In this scenario, we have vth = 25 mph (11.18 m/s) and Dveh to crash = 4 m. The rest of the
parameters remain the same as above. Using (13), (14), (16), and (17), we have
Dped to crash ∈ [0, 1.68] m,
Pscenario3(Conflict — Conditions 1 and 2 hold) = 0.0158. (18)
Similarly, for Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 1, we set vveh left = 4.5 m/s and Dveh to crash = 3 m while
keeping the the rest of the parameters same as in Pedestrian/Maneuver Type 2. Then, we have
Dped to crash ∈ [0.063, 1.82] m,
Pscenario1(Conflict — Conditions 1 and 2 hold) = 0.0145. (19)
So far, we have calculated conflict probabilities for the three scenarios which are in the range
[0.0125, 0.0158]. As in (2), this conflict probability can be translated into a collision probability as
follows:
P (Collision — Conditions 1 and 2 hold) =
P (Conflict — Conditions 1 and 2 hold)
γ
,
where γ is the conflict-to-collision ratio for the corresponding pedestrian occlusion scenario. Al-
though we are not aware of any empirical estimates for γ specific to scenarios involving pedestrians,
it is reasonable to expect that γ should be lower than that for the various scenarios considered in
[7]. There are two reasons for this: (i) the empirical estimates are not conditioned on occlusions,
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and (ii) we account for basic evasive maneuvers such as braking by the AV. Even if we set γ as the
largest observed value across all scenarios in [7], we have
P (Collision — Conditions 1 and 2 hold) ≈ 2.8× 10−6, (20)
which is significantly high considering that such occlusions are commonplace in urban driving
situations. Due to the reasons mentioned above, we can expect this collision probability to be
considerably higher. This strongly suggests that such occlusions are a major cause of crashes
involving pedestrians.
2.4 How can such crashes be prevented?
It is clear that under the occlusion scenarios described above, an AV cannot guarantee safety despite
having perfect sensing and perception capabilities. The underlying cause of such crashes is the
inability to detect vehicles or pedestrians on conflicting paths in time to take evasive action. Thus,
mitigating such crashes requires additional communication between vehicles and the infrastructure
so that this critical information is relayed to the necessary parties in time. The vehicle-vehicle
scenario illustrated in Figure 1 can be prevented by placing a sensor on the through moving lane
at a sufficient distance from the conflict zone depending on the through moving vehicle speeds.
For example, if the speed limit on the through moving lane is 30 mph and considering a worst
case human reaction time ρ = 2.5 s, a sensor placed at 56 m from the conflict zone will provide
enough time for the TMV to prevent the impending crash [21]. In the vehicle-pedestrian scenario
illustrated in Figure 3, an additional sensor detecting pedestrian movement on the crosswalk would
be required to prevent the crash.
3 Traffic Violation
Traffic violation is one of the leading causes of crashes on the roads, accounting for 32% of all
crashes [29]. Red light running is a common violation that is responsible for a large number of
crashes each year. Figure 4 depicts the setup for a conflict resulting from this violation. Vehicle
V (violator) is going with speed vV from south to north and runs the red light. Vehicle E (ego
vehicle) has the right of way traveling from west to east. In the following analysis, we compute
the probability of a conflict between vehicles E and V. Recall that a conflict does not mean crash,
but rather a hazardous situation that may lead to a crash, as discussed in Section 2. We consider
the violation scenario from the point of view of an ego-vehicle. Therefore, we compute the conflict
probability under the condition that vehicle E is present at the intersection.
As discussed in [22], at intersections equipped with stop bar detectors and a conflict monitoring card
that provides programmatic access to a signal phase, it is possible to monitor red light violations
and collect corresponding statistics. An example of such data, collected at the intersection of
Montrose Parkway and E. Jefferson Street in North Bethesda, MD, is presented in Figure 5.5 Let
5Note the spike of violations in the east and less in the west directions between midnight and 6 A.M. This
could be explained by the fact that the southbound direction leads to the Kaiser hospital, and during the night the
south-to-north approach has practically no traffic. Hence, eastbound and westbound violators feel relatively safe,
not expecting danger from that approach during night hours. Shortly before 6 A.M. the situation changes sharply,
as traffic to the hospital starts to increase.
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Figure 4: Two scenarios of red light violations: (a) vehicles with a right of way wait in queue and
slowly start moving as the light changes to green; (b) vehicles with a right of way randomly arrive
during green time.
νA(t) denote the expected number of violations for a given approach A and a given time t. On the
south-to-north (northbound – NB) approach, we have νNB = 0.67 violations between 4:00 and 4:15
A.M., and νNB = 1.91 violations between 12:00 and 12:15 P. M.. These values for the given time
intervals are averaged over a period of one year, from 02/01/2019 through 01/31/2020.
Figure 5: Intersection of Montrose Parkway and E. Jefferson Street in North Bethesda, MD: Statis-
tics of red light violations collected over one year from 02/01/2019 through 01/31/2020.
We assume that a red light violation occurs shortly after the signal phase change: when the green
(or yellow) light for vehicle V switches to red.6 Suppose, an average signal cycle length is Tc, so over
a period ∆T we expect to have ∆T/Tc green-to-red switches. Then, the probability of a violation
6Violating late in the red phase would imply a malicious intent, a rather rare occasion, which we do not consider.
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from approach A during a green-to-red switch is
pVA(t) =
TcνA(t)
∆T
. (21)
Thus, given the cycle length Tc = 150 seconds at our intersection of Montrose Parkway / E.
Jefferson Street and ∆T = 900 seconds, we get pVNB = 0.67/6 = 0.11 between 4:00 and 4:15 A.M.
and pVNB = 1.91/6 = 0.32 between 12:00 and 12:15 P.M.
Let us now discuss the probability of a conflict between vehicles E and V. Such a conflict, if it
occurs, happens in the conflict zone CZ, indicated by a dashed line in Figure 4. Let dy denote the
south-to-north size of this conflict zone – i.e., the distance vehicle V has to cover being exposed
to a conflict with vehicle E. This distance includes the expected length of vehicle V itself. In our
sample intersection, dy = 17 meters (the expected length of vehicle V is 5 meters). The time taken
by vehicle V to cross the conflict zone is
tcross = td + dy/vV. (22)
Here, td is the time interval between the signal phase switch and the instant when vehicle V reaches
the conflict zone CZ. The arrival of vehicle E at the intersection during the violator’s crossing can
happen in two ways:
(a) Vehicle E drives through the intersection at the moment of the signal phase switch and, as the
its light turns from red to green, at a constant speed without stopping. This case is depicted
in Figure 4(a).
(b) Vehicle E is already there – waiting at the red light. And, as soon as the light turns green, it
starts moving. This case is depicted in Figure 4(b).
Since we compute the conflict probability under the assumption that the ego-vehicle is present in
the intersection, for both cases (a) and (b), pEEB = 1.
It remains to compute the probability of a conflict between vehicles V and E under the condition
that vehicle V runs the red light and vehicle E is also present at the intersection. Let dCZ denote
the distance from the stop bar of the west-to-east approach to the conflict zone CZ, and dx – the
size of the conflict zone CZ in the west-to-east direction. Distance dx includes an expected length
of vehicle E. In our sample intersection, dCZ = 16 meters and dx = 16 meters (accounts for 5 meters
of the expected length of vehicle E).
A conflict exists when both vehicles, V and E, are present in the conflict zone CZ simultaneously.
This happens if the following condition holds:
• Case (a):
dCZ
td + dy/vV
< vE ≤ dCZ + dx
td
, (23)
where vE is the speed with which vehicle E arrives at and goes through the intersection.
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• Case (b):
2
dCZ
(td + dy/vV)2
< aE ≤ 2dCZ + dx
t2d
, (24)
where aE is the acceleration with which vehicle E starts moving once its light turns green.
It is possible to estimate the probabilities of conditions (23) and (24) for different delay periods td,
if we have some idea about the range of values for vV, vE and aE.
At the intersection of Montrose Parkway and E. Jefferson Street the speed limit in direction south-
to-north is 25 mph (11.18 m/s). To be more conservative, we will assume the speed of the violator,
vV = 10 m/s. The speed of vehicles crossing this intersection in the west-to-east direction measured
by the detectors is presented in the histogram in Figure 6. The typical vehicle acceleration from
the intersection stop bar after its light turns green ranges between 1 and 2 m/s2. Assuming that
aE ∼ N (1.5, 0.25), we can estimate the conditional probabilities of the conflict between vehicles E
and V for cases (a) and (b) for different values of td – see Figure 7.
Figure 6: Distribution of speeds vE, with which vehicles cross the intersection of Montrose Parkway
and E. Jefferson Street in the west-to-east direction. The speed values are taken over a random
week of 2019.
Finally, we can express the probability of a conflict between vehicles E and V:
pconflict =
 p
V
NBp
(
dCZ
td+dy/vV
< vE ≤ dCZ+dxtd
)
, case (a),
pVNBp
(
2 dCZ
(td+dy/vV)2
< aE ≤ 2dCZ+dxt2d
)
, case (b),
(25)
where pVNB and is determined from (21).
Given the parameters of our intersection, these probabilities are presented in Figure 8 for two time
periods: 4:00-4:15 A.M. and 12:00-12:15 P.M..
These conflict probabilities can be translated into collision probabilities using (2) with γ = 2040
estimated for the through-cross traffic scenario in [7]. Based on a similar argument as in Section 2,
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Figure 7: Probabilities of a conflict under the condition that both vehicles, V and E, arrive at the
intersection of Montrose Parkway and E. Jefferson Street at the same time – cases (a) and (b).
Figure 8: Conflict probability computed using data from intersection of Montrose Parkway and E.
Jefferson Street for cases (a) and (b).
this suggests that such crashes will occur with a considerably high probability, which might explain
why traffic violations are involved in one-third of all crashes. If we think of the ego-vehicle as an
AV attempting to pass the intersection, it is evident that such traffic violations will jeopardize its
safety.
The probability of such a conflict could be reduced by I2V technology, provided that vehicle E and
the roadside infrastructure were connected. The violator V would be detected by combining stop bar
sensor activation with a signal phasing. Then a notification about a violation in a certain direction
would be broadcast by the roadside equipment. Intersection conflict avoidance (ICA) defined in the
SAE J2735 standard [25] could be used for this purpose. If vehicle E receives this broadcast before
it reaches the conflict zone CZ, it should brake. If, on the other hand, it is already inside CZ, it
should accelerate to clear the conflict zone faster.
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4 Behavior Prediction Uncertainty
One of the most challenging aspects of driving on the roads is that one’s own safety depends on
the behavior of surrounding vehicles. As humans, predicting the actions of vehicles around us is
a key component of the driving process. Attempts are being made to imbue AVs with the same
capability by training systems with large amounts of driving data. As there is a vast multitude
of driving scenarios and driver behaviors, it is unclear how well such systems generalize to unseen
situations. What makes such a prediction task even more challenging is that one’s own actions affect
surrounding vehicle behavior [24, 27]. For AVs that depend on such behavior prediction modules
for planning, inaccuracies in prediction can result in hazardous scenarios. An alternate approach
that circumvents the challenge of behavior prediction is to plan based on the worst-case behavior
of surrounding vehicles [28]. Although this seems appealing from a safety perspective, it is unclear
whether such an approach is feasible in the real world. If not, uncertainty in behavior prediction
will indeed result in crashes. In this section, we investigate whether this is the case using empirical
data for a common on-road scenario - merging on to a freeway.
Consider an AV attempting to merge from an on-ramp on to a freeway. As in Section 2, all other
vehicles are human driven. The AV decides to merge if the gap between the lead and lag vehicle on
the merging lane is large enough. This scenario falls within Type 16 - Changing Lanes/Same Direc-
tion in the NHTSA pre-crash scenario typology which accounts for 6.2% of all crashes. Moreover,
this scenario is particularly relevant for AVs as there have been several accounts of them having
difficulties merging into traffic [19].
Figure 9: An AV (in yellow) merging from on-ramp on to freeway.
We assume that vehicles on the freeway respond to changes in velocity of vehicles in front of them
and take evasive action to avoid a crash, albeit with a reaction time. Let ρAV and ρB denote the
reaction times of the AV and lag vehicle respectively. Let vAV, vF, and vB denote the speeds of the
AV, lead and lag vehicles at the time of the AV’s merging decision. Let dF and dB denote the gaps
between the lead vehicle and AV, and lag vehicle and AV respectively. We assume that all vehicles
have the same maximum acceleration and deceleration rates, aacc and adec respectively. In order to
guarantee safety, the AV must be able to safely evade any potential collision with the lead or lag
vehicle regardless of their actions. This implies that the AV must be safe in each of the following
worst-case scenarios:
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Time Observed Merging Gap (m) Safe Merging Gap (m)
7:50 - 8:05 43.19 93.79
8:05 - 8:20 35.63 84.22
8:20 - 8:35 27.44 75.90
Table 1: Observed and safe merging gaps for the NGSIM US-101 dataset.
1. Lead vehicle decelerates to a stop while AV merges,
2. Lag vehicle accelerates while AV merges.
Then, the safe distance for merging dsafe can be decomposed as follows:
dsafe = dF,safe + dB,safe + lAV, (26)
where dF,safe and dB,safe denote the minimum distance required to avoid a collision in cases (i) and
(ii) respectively, and lAV denotes the length of the AV. In case (i), the lead vehicle brakes to a stop
and the AV is able to react only after ρAV seconds, before which it maintains its initial velocity vAV.
Then, the AV can safely evade a collision if its distance from the lead vehicle dF satisfies
dF +
v2F
2adec
≥ vAVρAV + v
2
AV
2adec
. (27)
This gives us
dF,safe = max
{
vAVρAV +
v2AV − v2F
2adec
, 0
}
. (28)
In case (ii), the lag vehicle accelerates for ρB until it realizes that the AV is merging, after which
it decelerates to avoid crashing into the AV. The worst case in such a setting is if the AV is forced
to brake to a stop because of the lead vehicle decelerating to a stop. Thus, a collision with the lag
vehicle can be avoided as long as the gap dB satisfies
dB +
v2AV
2adec
≥ vBρB + 1
2
aaccρ
2
B +
(vB + ρBaacc)
2
2adec
. (29)
Thus, we have
dB,safe = max
{
vBρB +
1
2
aaccρ
2
B +
(vB + ρBaacc)
2 − v2AV
2adec
, 0
}
. (30)
We use the NGSIM US-101 dataset [2] to get estimates for vehicle velocities (vAV, vF, vB) and
observed merging gaps for three 15 minute intervals between 7:50 A.M. and 8:35 A.M. As the
AV is accounting for the worst-case, we set the lag vehicle reaction time ρB = 2.5 sec according
to the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) design
specifications based on the 95th percentile of empirical reaction time estimates - see Table 3 in [30].
We set ρAV = 0.83 sec, which is the mean of empirically observed AV reaction times - see Table 2 in
[6]. Using the following values for the rest of our problem parameters: aacc = 3 m/s
2, adec = 4 m/s
2
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and lAV = 4 m, we compute the safe merging gap dsafe for each of the time intervals as seen in
Table 1. It can be observed that the observed merging gaps are considerably smaller than the
corresponding safe merging gaps. Thus, the worst-case planning approach is not feasible in this
scenario. Unless the AV predicts the behavior of vehicles in the merging lane accurately, it cannot
merge with guaranteed safety. Thus, behavior prediction uncertainty will indeed result in crashes.
Deriving estimates for crash probability in this setting is challenging as it requires a model for how
vehicles react to surrounding vehicle behavior as well a probability distribution over possible vehicle
behaviors. However, the fact that behavior prediction modules are not always accurate combined
with the large number of merging crashes observed each year strongly suggests that such crashes
will persist with a significantly high probability.
The fundamental safety issue in the above merging example is that it requires all the involved
vehicles to be in agreement to ensure safety. In the absence of connectivity, predicting vehicle
behavior and planning accordingly is the only available recourse. Introducing connectivity between
vehicles (V2V) would obviate the need for such behavior prediction and as a result, ensure that the
merging maneuver can be executed safely [17, 32].
5 Conclusion
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have the potential to change the transportation landscape as we know
it and lead us to a safer future. It makes intuitive sense that the thousands of lives that are
unfortunately lost every year due to impaired, inattentive or reckless driving could be saved if
human drivers are replaced with AVs. However, a significant fraction of crashes cannot be explained
by these reasons. Instead, they are a consequence of a fundamental aspect of driving on the roads:
Our safety depends not only on our own actions but also the positions and actions of surrounding
vehicles - both of which might be unknown/partially known to us. In the absence of connectivity
with surrounding vehicles (V2V) or infrastructure (I2V), it is unclear whether AVs can avoid such
crashes. Even so, AV companies maintain that they will eventually eliminate all crashes without
relying on connectivity.
One proposed approach is to assume worst case positions and actions of surrounding vehicles and
plan accordingly to be safe [28]. While this seems appealing as it circumvents the challenges associ-
ated with behavior prediction and does not require connectivity, it turns out that such guaranteed
safety comes at a massive cost to traffic efficiency. As we show in our analysis, ensuring guaran-
teed safety would preclude vehicles from performing basic maneuvers like merging or unprotected
left-turns in common traffic scenarios. In the presence of uncertainty about surrounding vehicle
positions and behavior, some crashes are indeed unavoidable.
In this paper, we investigate three crash causes that tease out various aspects that make driving on
the roads challenging: (a) Occluded Vehicles/Pedestrians (unknown vehicle position), (b) Traffic
Violations (rule-following assumption violated), and (c) Behavior Prediction Uncertainty (inability
to accurately predict vehicle actions based on past observations). For each of these cases, we show
that it it impossible to guarantee worst-case safety without connectivity. We also provide some
estimates for the probability of a crash in such scenarios.
Recognizing that such situations are inevitable while driving on the roads, the objective of an
AV should be to manage crash risk while maintaining efficiency. Assessing crash probabilities
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in commonly occurring risky scenarios is an important step in this process. As we assume perfect
sensing and perception capabilities for AVs and idealized scenarios for our analysis, our estimates can
be considered as lower bounds for actual crash probabilities. More realistic bounds can be derived
by considering imperfections in road-user behavior and AV capabilities, as well as factors such as
vehicle failures, and varied road geometry and conditions. Looking through the lens of managing
crash risk, AVs can be seen as a collection of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS). Thus,
empirical estimates of ADAS effectiveness can be used to arrive at better estimates of crash reduction
due to AVs [15].
The crashes we have discussed above result from lack of observability of surrounding vehicle positions
or incorrect assumptions or predictions about vehicle actions. Communication with surrounding
vehicles or infrastructure would ensure that all involved vehicles can “see” each other and reach an
agreement regarding each others’ proposed actions [17, 21, 25, 32]. Thus, connectivity can bring
about a significant reduction in otherwise unavoidable crashes. However, connectivity comes with
its own safety challenges. Relying on information from other vehicles or infrastructure makes one
vulnerable to security attacks from malicious road users that can jeopardize safety. Additionally,
installing sensors on the roads and ensuring that all vehicles have the required technology to com-
municate would require a significant amount of time and economic resources. In order to reap the
safety benefits of connectivity, active research is needed to minimize its associated safety risks as
well as economic costs. Our hope for a future with zero crashes depends on it.
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